





We have been engaged inunediately heretofore in consid-
ering the law which is administered in the federal courts when
adjudicating controversies between citizens of different states,
and have shown, it may be thought, some warrant for saying that
in matters of "general concern," as distinguished from those in
the nature of local questions, these tribunals-have long been em-
ployed in building an independent body of non-statutory law,
or, in that sense, federal common law. It must be admitted,
however, that in so terming this body of law, one encounters
opposition from respectable authorities who class it otherwise.
Professor Willoughby 22- concedes that it is of "federal
creation (or at least of federal judicial determination)," and that
it is a substitute "for the state law with reference to matters
which by the federal Constitution are left within the exclusive
power of the state"; furthermore, that it "is neither laid down
in the Constitution, treaties and laws of Congress nor in con-
formity with the law of the state." He also concedes this body
of law is "unquestionably federal in the sense that it owes its
authority to. and is applied by, the federal courts"; but he -never-
theless maintains, "there is good reason for holding it is essen-
tially state law," saying, "The fact that it differs from the law as
laid down by the state courts is due to the peculiar circumstances
that, under our judicial system, two co-ordinate sets of courts
have the power to interpret and determine the common law of
the several states." 2.3 In other words, Professor Willoughby's
WILLOUGHBY, COXSrIrUTtOAL LAw, Vol. 11, pp. io38, 1039.
'=See also Smith v. Alabtama, 124 U. S. 465, 477-8 (1887).
"A determination in a given case of what that law [common law] is may
be different in a court of the United States from that which prevails in the
judicial tribunals of a particular state. This arises from the circumstance that
the courts of the United States in cases within their jurisdiction, where they
(367)
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thought is that, since, to use his own language, "the federal
courts do not sit as tribunals subordinate to the states, but as co-
ordinate with them, ... they have an independent right to de-
termine what is the non-statutory law of the state, using for
[this] purpose the same sources of information that the state
courts use.in determining for themselves."
Professor Willoughby's view may be said to represent fairly
the manner in which thuse who assert there is no federal common
law, and can be none, reconcile the opinions of the federal courts
which refuse to follow the law laid down in prior judicial deci-
sions of the state where a case was tried or whose law, for any
other reason, would ordinarily be applicable. It would seem,
according to this.view, that, when the federal courts decide inde-
pendently of the adjudications in a particular state, after con-
sulting the same sources available to the latter's courts,
1 24 and
arrive at a different conclusion of law from that administered
in the state, the law thus derived and applied may, nevertheles,
be classed as state law because it most nearly represents the con-
sensus of opinion in the various states respecting the point at
issue; or, as one writer on the subject has expressed it, in such
instances "the federal courts apply their own judgment to say
that the law [governing the case before them] is such as the
best reasoned authorities throughout the United States have de-
termined [to be applicable in approximately similar cases], and
this may naturally lead the [federal] court to the conclusion
that the state court [in question] has been ill-advised, and [in
prior cases] has determined the matter erroneously." 125 You
may be impressed, however, that this hypothesis represents an
ingenious mental effort to change the inherent and fundamental
are called upon to administer the law of the state in which they sit or by which
the transaction is governed, exercise an independent though concurrent 
juris-
diction; . . . but the law applied [is] none the less the law of that
state . . ." per Mathews, 1.
' Snare v. Friedman, 169 Fed. i, iz-r2 (C. C. A. 1909).
"In deciding what the common law of a state may be, they [the federal
courts] will resort to the same sources of information as are open to 
the
state courts, and find the evidence oi the law where the state couits must seek
it, in that general jurisprudence of vhich %e have spokcn." Gray, J.
3M36 Am. L. REY. 498, 521-5 (902), E. C. Et t.
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character of a body of law by simply chadiging its name and
calling it, not an indepedent federal common law, but a correct
leclaration by the federal judges of state common law; and you
may well think that the law thus laid down by the federal courts
calmot properly be called the law of the state involved, so long
as it is not recognized and applied by the courts of the jurisdic-
tion whose law it is supposed to be. In other words, so long
as the state law which is disregarded by the federal courts, as
presenting an incorrect understanding of,. or faulty reasoning
from, common law sources, contiuues to be regarded as correct
in cases arising exclusively in the courts of the particular state
involved, and the federal rule is neither binding upon nor fol-.
lowed by those tribunals, it can h.adly be classed as the authori-
tative law of such state. Thus, it is difficult to appreciate why
the non-statutory law administered by the federal courts should
be considered state common law simply because the federal
judges, among other sources of information, consult the com-
mon-law decisions of the various states, any more than why
state determination of law, independently arrived at, after con-
sulting federal decisions based on general principles, should be
called federal common law.
General principles of law administered by the United States
courts have authority in federal jurisprudence because they have
been thus recognized, just as the non-statutory law in a state
has authority because it is recognized and administered by the
courts of that jurisdiction. It would surely by incorrect to say
that the common law of Pennsylvania, for example, is essen-
tially the law of the other states of the Union, because at various
times the Pennsylvania courts have applied what they conceived
to be the best reasoned view of the majority of the states. On
many occasions the courts of Pennsylvania, and of other such
jurisdictions, disregard. the law laid down by their sister states.
and administer principles either of the English decisions or of
their own determination; therefore, strictly speaking, the con-
mon law of any given jurisdiction may be said to consist of tht
non-statutory rules announced and administered by its courts to
effect just results in cases before them The elements whtc.
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comprise this body of non-statutory law are drawn not only from
the comnmcn-law rules of the various states, and from English
dkcisiens. but from other sources; consequently one cannot ac-
cu;rte3 cla;s.if. the unwritten law of any one state as being
essentia.y th'.e law of the various states. No more can one prop-
er'3 so classify the non-statutory law administered by the fed-
eral courts.
If there existed somewhere in the at:ilospherre a single uni-
form body of com-..on-la.w rules which would-be binding on state
and federal courts alike, and which all of them implicitly and
correctly followed, without variation, the unwritten law of each
state, as well as of the federal courts, would be identical with
this universal common law; but, needless to say, although some
seem to think otherwise, there is no such recognized body of
law to which courts may resort for the purpose of obtaining
principles of ultimate authority. "The common. law," as Mr.
Justice Holnes has said, "is not a brooding omnipresence in the
sky, but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi sovereign
that can be identified." 22 Somewhat similar views were ex-
pressed by Mr. Justice Mitchell, of the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania, when he said: 127
"There is no such thing as a general common law,
separate from and irrespective of a particular state or gov-
ernment whose authority makes it law. By whom is a gen-
eral [common] law prescribed and what tribunal has author-
ity or recognition to declare or enforce it outside of the
local jurisdiction of the government it represents? Upon
many questions arising in the business dealings of men, the
laws of modern civilized states are substantially the same,
and it is therefore common to say that such is the law, but,
except as a convenient phrase, such general law does not
exist. There must be a state or government of which every
law can be predicated, and to whose authority it owes its
existence as law; without such sanction, it is not law at all;
with such sanction it is law without reference to its origin
or the concurrence of other states or people. Such sanction
it is the prerogative of the courts to declare."
' So. Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 2o5, 2 (i9x6).
' Forepaugh v. L RL Co., 128 Pa. 217, 226, 227, 18 Aft. 503 (1889).
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While there is no real body of common law aside from that
presented by the decisions of the courts, there is, of course, what,
for want of a more descriptive term, has been called the spirit
of the conmon law, consisting of fundamental conceptions of
right and wrong so manifest as to be generally accepted and
credited; but, after all is said on the subject, it must be admitted
that each jurisdiction pronounces its own rules, based on these
fundamental truths and the ripened customs of the people con-
cerned, and that every state disregards the decisions of other
jurisdictions as it pleases, with the result that the common law
throughout one state is dissimilar to the common law of other
states in many important respects.128 The law pronounced and
credited as authority by the federal courts may likewise be dis-
similar to the common law of the various states; and, since these
tribunals apply-to matters of general concern arising in litiga,
tion of the diverse-citizenship class, and also to matters in other
fields of litigation yet to be discussed-what they, in their inde-
pendent judgment, consider to be the true general rules, their
decisions thus arrived at may well be said to form a federal com-
mon law.
12 '
The fear has frequently been expressed that to admit the
existence of an independent federal common law in the kind of
cases we have just been discussing will encourage the United
States courts to encroach more generally upon the non-statutory
law of the states, and, in the end, to disregard their decisions
"The common law, it is said, we brought with us from the mother coun-
try, ar-. v I'-ch we claim as a most valuable heritage. This is admitted, but not
to the extent sometimes urged. The common law, in all its diversities, has not
been adopted by any one of the States. In some of them it has been modified
by statutes, in others by usage. And from this it appears that what may be
the common law of one state is not necessarily the common law of any other.
We must ascertain the common law of each state by its general policy, the
usages sanctioned by its courts, and its statutes."
Per McLean, J., Whieler v. Smith, et al., 5o U. S. 55, 78 (x85o).
_ See Vice Chancellor Sandford's remarks in Lynch v. Clarke, I Sandf.
Ch. 83, 654-655 (N. Y. 1843): "In my judgment there is no room for doubt,
but that to a limited extent the common law (or the principles of the common
law, as some prefer to express the doctrine) prevails in the United States as a
system of national jurisprudence. It seems to be a necessary consequence-
that in a matter which by the Union has become a national subject, to be con-
trolled by a principle co-extensive with the United States, in the absence of
constitutional or congressional provision on the subject, it must be regulated by
the principles of the Common Law, if they are pertinent and applicable.
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in all matters; but, as before said, if such a common law exists,
a failure to acknowledge it will not change the fact. 'Moreover,
the fear of acknowledgment overlooks the further fact ihat Con-
gress at any time, by simply changing the wording of section 34
of the Judiciary Act of 1789, could direct federal courts to fol-
low or disregard state decisions in matters of common law, if
either course were deemed desirable. Should the first be done,
the federal tribunals, when acting in cases under the diverse-
citizenship clause, would never administer an independent na-
tional common law, but the common law of the state in which
these tribunals were sitting. In the absence of such action, how-
ever, under present methods, does there not exist, at least in mat-
ters of general concern, what, for all practical purposes, is a fed-
eral common law, whether we call it by that name or not?
The next class of cases for consideration is that of Contro-
versies between States.
Jurisdiction over such controversies justiciable .in their na-
ture, is granted by the Constitution to the federal Supreme Court,
and the scope of this jurisdiction, as well as the nature of the
law administered in its exercise, can be more clearly understood
from an analysis of the case of Kansa.s v. Colorado.
130 Before
the incorporation of Kansas and Colorado into the Union as
states, the common law was in force in their respective terri-
tories, by reason of the Ordinance of 1787. On admission into
the Union, each state possessed the inherent right of sovereignty
to modify the existing common law by statute. Kansas con-
tinued to recognize generally the old English rules governing
riparian rights, whereas Colorado changed from the common law
and prescribed the doctrine of public ownership of flowing
waters.
The State of Colorado, within whose limits the Arkansas
River has its source, and through whose territory it flows into
Kansas, claimed the right to use the waters of this stream for
purposes of irrigation, albeit by so doing such waters should be
diminished and the river's flow interrupted. Kansas sought to
Kansas v. Colorado, zA U. S. 4,6 (9o6).
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restrain her sister state, alleging that the latter's action prevented
the natural and customary flow of the river into Kansas and
through its territory.
The United States filed an intervening petition, claiming the
right to control the waters in controversy to aid in the reclama-
tion of arid lands. So far, however, as the national government
was concerned, the petition was dismissed, as the threatened di-
version did not tend to diminish the navigability of the river,
and, therefore, no federal right was prejudiced.
Here, then, was a contest between two sovereign states, one
following, and the other refusing to follow, the old common-law
rules as to riparian rights. The difficulty which faced the court
grew out of the fact that Congress had made 'no law which
reached the case, and lacked power to do so, further, that the.
law of neither state could prevail against 
that of the other; i~i
facts which, at first sight, might seem to withdraw the matter
from judicial consideration. The court, however, having as-
sumed jurisdiction, had to administer some law; but what
law? 132 Mr. Justice Brewer, appreciating this situation, dis-
posed of it as though he were a common-law judge; and, in
reply to a contention that such a course could not-be followed,
he wrote:
"It is [asserted] there is no common law of the
United States as distinguished from the common law of the
several states. [The same] contention was made in Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Call Pub. Co.. where the court said:
'Properly understood, no exceptions can be taken to declara-
tions of this kind, [for] there is no body of federal com-
mon law separate and distinct from the common law ex-
isting in the several states in the [same] sense that there is
a body of statute law enacted by Congress separate and
distinct from the body bf statute law enacted by the several
states, but it is an entirely different thing to hold that there
is no commong law in force generally throughout the United
States."'
I The Antelop, io Wheaton 66, 122 (U. S. 1825).
mJUDicrAL SETTLEMENT OF CONPmoRSIEs BETWEEN 
STATES, JAMES ]P."WIN
Scorn, Carnegie Endowment for Inte't. it'nal Peace, 
p. ,447.
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Judge Brewer quotes Chancellor Kent's view 13 of the com-
mon law as "Including those principles, usages and rules of ac-
tion applicable to the government and security of persons and
property which do not rest for their authority upon any express
and positive declaration of the will of the legislature." As this
-body of law "does not rest," the Judge adds, "on any statute or
other written declaration of the sovereign,.there must, as to-each
principle thereof, be a first statement; [and] those statements
are found in the decisions of courts, the first statement presenting
the principle as certainly as the last. Multiplication of declarations
merely adds certainly; for after all, the common law is but the
accumulated expressions of the various judicial tribunals in
their efforts to ascertain what is right and just between individ-
uals in respect to private disputes."
Then, returning to a consideration of the particular matter
before the court, the opinion goes on to say:
"As Congress cannot make compacts between the
States, as it cannot, in respect to certain matters, by legis-
lation compel their separate action, disputes between them
must be settled either by force or else by appeal to tribunals
empowered to determine the right and wrong thereof.
Force under our system of government is eliminated. -The
clear language of the Constitution vests in this court the
power to settle those disputes: We have exercised" that
power in a variety of instances, determining in the several
instances the justice of the dispute. Nor is our jurisdiction
ousted, even if, because Kansas and Colorado are States
sovereign and independent in local matters, the relations
between them depend in any respect upon principles of inter-
national law. . . . 'Sitting, as it were, as fn international,
as well as a domestic tribunal, we apply federal law, state
law, and international law, as the exigencies of the partic-
ular case may demand.' . . . One cardinal rule, underlying
all the relations of the States to each other, is that of equal-
ity of right. Each State stands on the same level with all
the rest; it can impose its own legislation on no one of the
others, and is bound to yield its .own views to none. Yet,
whenever . . . the action of one State reaches through the
' I Kent 471.
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agency of natural laws into the territory of another State,
the question of the extent and the lirihitations of the rights
of the two States becomes a matter of justiciable dispute be-
tween them, and this court is called upon to settle that dis-
pute in such away as will recognize the equal rights.of both
and at the same time establish justice between them.- In
other words, through these successive disputes and deci-
sions, this court is practically building up what may not im-
properly be called interstate common law." 
134
Recently a somewhat similar dispute arose between Colorado
and Wyoming, 35 and the federal Supreme Court disposed of it
along like lines.
The important principle applied in the cases we are now
considering, is that, if a controversy is justiciable in its nature,
and no statutory rule controls, the Supreme Court will admin-
ister the particular kind of law necessary to effect a just settle-
ment, without regard to the sources from which the law is de-
rived. The court has referred to this law as "common law in
force generally throughout the United States," 138 and has said
that it "may not improperly be called 'interstate common
law' " 23'; but, as it constitutes part of the very considerable body
of unwritten rules announced and administered by the federal
courts, it might more properly be termed federal common law.
The particular form of federal common law under imme-
diate discussion differs, however, from that administered by the
United States courts in disposing of matters of general concern
arising in diverse-citizenship cases, in that it affects sovereign
states, rather than their individual citizens; but both forms are
similar, in that they exist independently of any congressional
statute, directing what law shall be administered. The federal
non-statutory law as applied in adjudicating matters of general
concern, under the diverse-citizenship clause, e:..*_ s as though
section 34 of the Judiciary Act had not been passed; and the
"'Kansas v. Colorado, supra, p. 96.
'yoring v. Colorado, 259 U. S. 419 (92).
'Kansas v. Colorado, supra, p. "6.
1 Ibid, p. 9.
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federal unwritten law in cases between states exists in the ab-
scnce of any congressional statute directing what law shall be
applied; they, therefore, possess the common characteristics of
being common law, independently announced and administered
by the federal courts, separate and distinct from the .ommon
law of the several states.
The next instance for our consideration, of civil jurisdic-
lien in the feder. courts, is that which arises, not from the char-
acter of the p rties (as in the cases between citizens of differ-
ent states and those between the states themselves), but from the
subject-matter of the suit; that is to say, where the question in
controversy i:volves t1w vzational Corstitution, the fedcral laws,
or intcrnaliornal treatfcs, and, consequCAently, it matters not who
miy be parties to the litigation.
It is sufficient for present purposes, to discusss only one
example under this phase of federal jurisdiction, namely, the reg-
ulation of interstate commerce.
Ccngress, by article I, section 8 of the Constitution, pos-
se3ses power to regulate commerce among the several states, and
may pass any legislation essential to control properly the rela-
tions of interstate carriers; but, if the national legislature should
not act, then the question arises, are the relations of such car-
riers to be subject to no federal control, or, when a suit involv-
ing their rights and duties is brought in the federal courts, will
they be determined -judicially in accordance with common-law
principles?
In Interstate Conmnerce Conanission v. B. 0 . R. R.
Co.,'" the federal Supreme Court said:
"Prior to the . . . Interstate Commerce Act, railway
traffic in this country was regulated by the principles of the
common law applicable to common carriers, which de-
manded little more than that they should carry for all per-
sons who applied, in the order in which the goods were de-
livered at the particular station, and that their charges for
transportation should be reasonable."
I 145 tt S. 263 27S (1891).
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Later, in 1894, the case of Murray v. Chicago & N. W.
Ry. Co.,189 arose, which was an action to recover damages for
alleged unreasonable rates charged for transportation of freight,
between the years 1875 and i897. It was argued that, inas-
much as Congress had not prescribcd by statute the rules applic-
able to carriers in such a case, the federal courts possessed no
power to determine them; that the silence of Congress must be
taken as an indication of the intent to leave such commerce free
from all restraint and, therefore, common carriers assumed no
common-law liability in udertaking shipments of goods from
one state to another.
The court, however, thought othcrwise, and, speaking by
Mr. Justice Shiras, said:
"If the theory now contended for by defendant com-
pany be correct, then from the foundation of the govern-
ment [until the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act]
it was opea to all common carriers engaged in foreign or
interstate conimerce to act as they pleased in regard to ac-
cepting or refusing freights, in regard to the prices they
might chzarge, in regard to the care they should exercise,
and the sped with which they should transport and deliver
the property p,!aced in their charge. . . . Can it be possible
that the transcontinental railways and other federal cor-.
porations engaged in foreign and interstate commerce, in
the absence of congressional legislation, were not under any
legal restraints, and that the citizen, in his dealings with
them, was without legal renedy or protection? In the ab-
sence of congressional legislation, what law could be ap-
plied to them, with regard to matters under the exclusive
control of the national government, except the principles of
the common law or the law maritime?" 
140
S62 Fed. 24, 37 (C. C. 1894).
Mr. E. P. Prantice, 9 CoL. LA Rr.v. 375, 383-4 (igo> ), Common Law
and Interstate Carriers, says: "Here then frankly is the old argument ab 
incon-
vcnenfi. A field of federal jurisdiction has been discovered, unoccupied 
for a
century by any federal statute, arid yd from it all state law has been excluded
and Judge Shiras repeated the *.btrines which were first announced 
by Mr.
Justice Iredell of the authorit) ia the ab cnce of a federal statute of a federal
common law."
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Then Judge Shiras adds:
"The conclusion I reach upon this subject is that at the
time of the separation of the colonies from the mother coun-
try, and at the time of the adoption of the Constitution,
there was in existence a common law, derived from the coin-
mon law of England, and modified to suit the surroundings
of the people; that the adoption of the Constitution and
consequent creation of the national government did not ab-
-rogate this common law; that the division of governmental
powers and duties between the national and state govern-
ments provided for in the Constitution did not deprive the
people who formed the Constitution of the benefits of the
common law; that, as to such matters as were, by the Con-
stitution committed to the control of the national govern-
ment, there were applicable thereto the law of nations, the
maritime law, the principles of equity, and the common law,
according to the nature of the particular matter; that to
secure the enforcement of these several systems when ap-
plicable, the Constitution and Congress, acting in further-
ance of its provisions, have created the Supreme Court of
the United States and the other courts inferior thereto, and
have conferred upon these courts the right and power to
enforce the principles of the law of nations, of the law
maritime, of the system of equity, and of the common law,
in all cases conz'ng waithin the jurisdiction of the federal
courts; applying, in each instance, the system which the
nature of the case demands; that, as to all matters of na-.
tional importance over which paramount legislative control
is conferred upon Congress, the courts of the United States
(the Supreme Court being the final arbiter) have the right
to declare -what are the rules deducible from the principles
of gcnral jurisprudence which control the given case, and
to define the duties and obligations of the parties thereto."
After making this significant statement as to the existence
of a federal common law, Judge Shiras applied it to the case in
hand thus:
"In determining the obligations assumed by a commun
carrier engaged in interstate commerce, the court has the
right to al)ply the rules of the conmon law, unless the same
have been changed by competent legislative action; and,
theref(,re, in the present case. all shipments made before the
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adoption of the Interstate Commerce Act are governed by
the common law, and those made since the adoption of that
act by the common law as modified by that act."
The same view was cited with approval in a. later case in-
volving an interstate telegraph carrier, namely, Western Union
Tel. Co. v,. Call Pub. Co.1" ' The Western Union received for
transmission news dispatches from the State Journal Company
and the Call Publishing Company, charging the latter a higher
rate than the former. The Call Publishing Company contended
that the excess charge was unreasonable, and brought suit
against the telegraph company in a state court, resulting in a
verdict and judgment for plaintiff, which was reversed by the
Nebraska Supreme Court, because of trial errors. A second trial
again resulted in a verdict and judgment for plaintiff, which
was affirmed by the state supreme court; whereupon the Western
Union Company sued out a writ of error to the Federal Supreme
Court.
The latter court affirmed, Mr. Justice Brewer saying:
"The contention of the telegraph company is substan-
tially that the services which it rendered to the publishing.
company were a matter of interstate commerce; that Con-
gress has sole jurisdiction over such matters, and can alone
prescribe rules and regulations therefor; that it had not, at
the time these services were rendered, prescribed any regu-
.lations concerning them; that there is no national common
law, and that whatever may be the statute or common law
of Nebraska is wholly immaterial; and that, therefore, there
being no controlling statute or common law, the state court
erred in holding the telegraph company liable for any dis-
crimination in its charges between the plaintiff and the jour-
nal company."
To these contentions Judge Brewer answered:
"While there is no body of federal common law sep-
arate and distinct from the common law existing in the sev-
eral states in the [same] sense that there is a body of stat-
ute law, [yet] it is an entirely different thing to hold that
20 181 U. S. 92, 94. 100102 (x9oo).
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there is no common law in force generally throughout the
United States and that the countless multitude of inter-
state commercial transactions are subject to no rules and
burdened by no restrictions other than those expressed in
the statutes of Congres."
Then he puts the question, "Can it be that the great multi-
tude of interstate commercial transactions are freed from the
burdens created by the common law, as so defined, and are sub-
ject to no rule except that to be found in the statutes of Con-
gress?" and answers, "We are dearly of opinion that this can-
not be, nd that the principles of the common law are operative
upon all interstate commercial transactions except so far as
they are modified by Congressional enactment."
Thus it may be seen, the authorities dearly indicate that,
when there is no congressional statute prescribing the law to be
administered in matters over which the national legislature has
exclusive control, the federal courts do not always refuse for that
reason to decide the cases brought before them; on the contrary,
in the cases which we have been examihing, the supreme court
took jurisdiction because the litigation before it involved trans-
actions covered by the laws of the United States, and, on each
occasion, it applied such common-law principles as the court, in
the independent exercise of its judgment, considered appropri-
ate and just under the circumstances involved. What is said in
those cases regarding the applicability of common-law principles
to interstate commerce would seem to make them equally ap-
plicable to other matters under the control of the federal gov-
ernment, and, therefore, within the laws of the United States.
Reason as you may, the decisions under discussion form
part of a body of unwritten, or common law, separate and dis-
tinct from the common law of any particular state and, having
been pronounced by the federal courts and followed as authori-
ties therein, may be classified as constituents of an independent
federal common law; but the particular branch of this common
law which we have been engaged in considering, namely, cases
where the question in controversy involves matters within the
exclusive control of the national government, becomes, from our
THE COMMON LAW AND OUR FEDERAL JURISPRUDENCE 38!
present point of view, less important, and the cases thereunder
diminish in value, as Congress adequately provides by legislation
for the subjects entrusted by the Constitution to its control. As
this occurs, the common law is used by the federal courts, not
to work out substantive rights in the absence of congressional
action, but to interpret and amplify rights already provided for
by statute; in other words, under such circumstances, the federal
courts resort to the common law for purposes of interpretation
more than in the exercise of annunciatory powers.
In addition to the phases of civil jurisdiction thus far con-
sidered, and as relevant to the interpretative power of the courts,
it may be well to call attention to certain instances of common-
law interpretation covering subjects dealt with in the Constitu-
tion itself; and also, to examine the subject of public policy as
a separate ground of common-law decisions in federal cases.
When discussing the criminal side of federal law, we ob-
served that, as to certain matters contained both in the Constitu-
tion and congressional statutes, the United States judges neces-
sarily are obliged to resort to external sources for purposes of
interpretation, and that, as a consequence, they have developed,
by this process, a kind of independent "common law resting on
national authority"; 142 or at least, they have recognized that
there is a common law imbedded in federal jurisprudence. The
same process is inherent in civil matters.
By the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, it is
provided that "all persons born or naturalized in the United
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States." In construing this provision Chief Justice Waite
observed: 14s "The Constitution does not say in words who shall
be natural born citizens; resort must be had elsewhere to ascer-
tain that." Then he proceeded to resort to the common law as
an aid in the construction of this provision. Later, Justice
Gray,' 44 in considering the organic law, after noting with ap-
proval Chief Justice Waite's views, also stated that:
,, WnLLOUGE Y, CoNsnTunON, Vol. 1I, p. 1030.
'"Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wal. i62, x67 (U. S. 1874)..
"'U. S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 654-5 (1897).
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"The provisions [in question] must be interpreted in
the light of the English common law, the principles and
history of which were familiarly known to the framers of
the Constitution; [for] the language of the Constitution,
as has been well said, could not be understood without ref-
erence to the common law."
The right of eminent domain can be exercised by the United
States in any part of the country, so far as may be necessary
to the enjoyment of the powers conferred upon the national
government. This right is recognized by the Fifth Amendment
in these words, "nor shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation." The question as to what court
has -jurisdiction over the mode in which the right shall be exer-
cised came before the Supreme Court in Kohl v. United States.""
Congress authorized the secretary of the treasury to purchase
a suitable building in Cincinnati to accommodate the United
States courts, and appropriated the necessary money: It was
contended that, inasmuch as the statute did not expressly author-
ize the condemnation proceedings to be had in the Circuit Court,
nor provide a mode of taking the land and determining com-
pensation, that Court was without jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court held otherwise, Justice Strong saying: 
148
"The Judiciary Act of 1789 conferred upon the circuit
courts of the United States jurisdiction of all suits at com-
mon law or in equity, when the United States, or any officer
thereof, suing under the authority of an act of Congress,
are plaintiffs. If then, a proceeding to take land for public
uses by condemnation may be a suit at common law, juris-
'Kohl v. U. S., 91 U. S. 367 (1875).
0 Ibid, 375, 376.
Mr. Justice Field dissented, saying: "The federal courts have no inherent
jurisdiction of a proceeding instituted for the condemnation of property; and
I do not find any statute of Congress conferring upon them such authority. The
Judiciary Act of 1789 only invests the circuit courts of the Urrked States with
jurisdiction, concurrent with that of the State courts, of suits of a civil
nature at common law or in equity; and these terms have reference to those
classes of cases which are conducted by regular pleadings between parties,
according to the established doctrines prevailing at the time in the jurisprudence
of England,,"
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diction of it is vested in the Circuit Court. That it is a
'suit' admits of no question. . . . When, in the eleventh
section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, jurisdiction of suits
of a civil nature at common law or in equity was given to
the circuit courts, it was intended to embrace not merely
suits which the common law recognized as among its old
and settled proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were
to be ascertained and determined as distinguished from
rights in equity, as well as in admiralty. The right of emi-
nent domain always warf a right at common law. It was not
a right in equity, nor was it even the creature of a statute.
The time of its exercise may have been prescribed by stat-
ute; but the right itself was superior to any statute. That
it was not enforced through the agency of a jury is im-
material; for many civil as well as criminal proceedings at
common law were without a jury. It is difficult, then, to
see why a proceeding to take land in virtue of the govern-
ment's eminent domain, and determining the compensation
to be made for it, is not, within the meaning of the statute,
a suit at common law, when initiated in a court [of law].
It is an attempt to enforce a legal right. It ic quite imma-
terial that Congress has not. enacted that the compensation
shall be ascertained in a judicial proceeding. That ascer-
tainment is in its nature at least quasi-judicial. Certainly
no other mode than a judicial trial has been provided."
This case is significant not only as showing that the federal
judges were obliged to resort to common-law sources for pur-
poses of constitutional interpretation, but that they had to apply
common-law principles in order to give effect to the right of
eminent domain possessed by the United States Government.
So much for the cases of interpretation of civil matters in the
Constitution and statutes.
PUBLIC POLICY
This brings us to the application by federal courts of rules
of public policy, long recognized as a common-law ground of
decision. In origin, it is likely that "agreements to restrain trade
or to promote litigation were the first to elicit the principle that
the courts would look to the interests of the public in giving
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efficacy to contracts"; 147 and while, at the present time, it may
not be possible to circumscribe or define the exact limits within
which the principles of public policy will be applied, judges re-
peatedly recognize them, and use them as the bases of decisions
in particular cases. If one endeavored -to obtain, from the varied
and numerous judicial statements, a clear idea of the qature and
limits of public policy as a ground of judicial decision, he would
meet with no little difficulty; but it is clear that certain definite
principles have come to be recognized, the application of which
to particular instances necessarily varies with the progressive
development of public opinion and morality, and that, from time
to time, as the public interests and convenience require, these
principles, like other tenets of the common law, will expand ac-
cordingly. In the field of contracts, Sir George Jessel, Master
of the Rolls, once remarked, "You have this paramount public
policy to- consider, that you are not lightly to interfere with the
freedom of contract." 148 Courts are positive, however, in their
refusal to enforce various kinds of contracts which are definitely
contrary to good morals, or which threaten the dignity, respect
or existence of the legal tribunals themselves, or of the govern-
ment; and the federal courts assert the right, exercised by com-
mon-law tribunals, to decide such cases on general principles.
T!.ere is no precise way of determining how extensively these
principles may be applied, for, in the field under discussion,
United States judges are guided, like their brothers in other
courts, by the extent to which public interests, morals and con-
venience require protection. It is not necessary, therefore, to
attempt a minute analysis of federal cases in which public policy
has been recognized as a ground of decision; but it may be help-
ful to point out a few instances, which, no doubt, will suggest
others.
A consul-general of a foreign government, residing in this
country, entered into a contract whereby, in consideration of a
"'SIa WULLAm "AxsoN, LAw or CoONAcr (isth ed. i92o), p. 243, citing
Y. B., 2 Henry V, pl. 26 (414); Egerton v. Earl Brownlow, 4 H. L C. x, 237
(1853). See, however, SIa FREDERICK POLLOCK, CONTRACTS (8th ed. 1911), p.
328, who thinks the discouragement of wagers was the foundation of the doc-
trine.
.3 Printing Co. v. Sampsom, L R. ig Eq. 462, 465 (1875).
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stipulated percentage, he agreed to use his influence, in favor of
a local manufacturing company, with an agent sent by the gov-
ernment which the consul-general represented, to examine and
report in regard to the purchase of arms; and, through the exer-
cise of such influence, sales of arms were made by the company
to the government. The consul-general sued to recover the per-
centage, 1 40 .in a federal court; but it refused to enforce the con-
tract, on the ground of pablic policy. Similarly, the federal
courts declined to enforce a contract whereby A agreed to pro-
cure B's appointment as special consul in certain cases against
the United States, if B would agree to pay over to A one-half
the fee obtained from the government; 1 0 and, in like manner,
they have refused relief in other cases where the contract sought
to be enforced or the means pursued were either illegitimate or
corrupt. Justice Swayne stated in one such case: 151
"It is a rule of common law of universal application
that, where a contract, express or implied, is tainted with
either immorality or is contrary to public policy as to the
consideration or thing to be done, no alleged right founded
upon it can be enforced in a court of justice";
and it may be said that this common-law rule was the controlling
force in all the federal decisions under the present heading, in-
cluding Marshall v. B. & 0. R. R. Co.152 In that case, Marshall,
a citizen of Virginia, sued a railroad company incorporated in
Maryland, to recover the sum of $5o,ooo, which he alleged they
owed him under a special contract for services in obtaining the
enactment of a statute by the legislature of Virginia, which
granted to the company a right of way through the latter state
to the Ohio River. The case was brought up on a writ of error
from the Circuit Court of Maryland to the Supreme Court of
the United States, which latter tribunal held the contract void.
'Oscanyan v. Arms Co., io3 U. S. 26t (188o).
See also Toot Co. v. Norris, 69 U. S. 45 (1863).
Meguire v. Corwine, 1o U. S. io8 (1879).
mTrist v. Child, 88 U. S. 441, 448 (t874).
Marshall v. B. & 0. P. R. Co., 57 U. S. 314, 333-34 (1853).
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Justice Grier, resting his opinion on general common-law prin-
ciples, stated:
"It is an undoubted principle of the common law that
it will not lend itself to enforce a contract io do an act ;vhich
is illegal, or which is inconsistent with sound morals or
public policy; or which tends to corrupt or contaminate, by
improper influences, the integrity of our social or political
institutions .... Legislators should act from high con-
siderations of public duty; public policy and sound morality
do therefore imperatively require that courts should put the
stamp of their disapprobation on every act, and pronounce
void every contract, the ultimate or probable tendency of
which would be to sully the purity or -mislead the judg-
ments of those to whom the high trust of legislation is con-
fided."
The cases last discussed are of value mainly because of their
broad reference to general principles of the common law as a
source of decision in the federal courts; but they also represent
acknowledgments by the United States courts of common-law
principles of public policy which, because of their independent
recognition in, and actual application by, those tribunals can be
considered as thus incorporated into, and forming part of, a
federal common law. One might analyze other phases of fed-
eral jurisprudence, and no doubt discover the existence of still
additional examples of such acknowledgment and recognition;
but, possibly you will agree, enough examples have been given
to show a real basis for the belief that there now exists a system
of federal commoii law, in the sense of a considerable body of
non-statutory rules accredited in, and administered by, the United
States courts without regard to, or independent of, the local
sources from which they may be derived. Of course, this fed-
eral system can never be as comprehensive in its scope as in the
case of an ordinary common-law jurisdiction, because the na-
tional government itself is one of limited power; but, neverthe-
less, the authorities already examined show a large field 
of
common-law development.
As we have seen, in litigation between the states, the fed-
eral courts have of necessity resorted to the general principles
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of the common law. Again, in many instances of the exercise
of jurisdiction purely because the cases involved the laws of the
United States, these tribunals have gone to the common law to
work out the ends of justice; and they have also gone to that
source for necessary light in construing the national Constitution
and acts of Congress, even when the law involved concerned mat-
ters of a criminal nature While none of the cases we have re-
viewed is broad enough to be taken as a recognition of the rule,
prevailing in what are known as common-law jurisdictions in
the strict sense of that term, that the le scripta must be con-
strued so as to conform to all the relevant general principles of
the common law, not repealed or modified by legislation, such
cases are of interest as showing recognitions by the United
States courts of the fact that relevant common-law customs and
general principles must be taken into account in order to admin-
ister our federal jurisprudence properly; that, at least to this
extent, these customs and principles form part of our naitional
legal system; and that, in many instances, they may apply with
controlling force. As to the group of cases involving what the
federal Supreme Court has referred to as "a common law of
interpretation resting on national authority," "s while the opin-
ions in some of them may possibly. suggest that the names, cus-
toms and general principles of the common law were used
therein more as ads to the construction of the written law than
as substantive law itself, yet, in other cases which we have re-
viewed, particularly those within the diverse-citizenship class,
and in the class covering litigation between the several states of
the -ui,,on, the federal courts have gone further. In these two
last-mentioned classes, the courts have not only resorted to the
general principles of the common law as an aid to interpretation
but also as containing governing rules. Moreover, in the diverse-
citizenship cases, where the litigation involved matters of gen-
eral concern, the federal tribunals, as we have seen, have de-
parted from the state common law as decided by the local courts
and administered their own independent view of applicable gen-
eral peinciples, without regard to the source whence derived.
I Smith v. Alabama, x24 U. S. 46, 478-9 (1887); and see note'6z, xvpra.
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True, in some of the opinions, the law administered is
treated as though common to all the states, and called "inter-
state common law," 154 but, since this name represents a fic-
tion, it would tend toward greater frankness, generality, equal-
ity and certainty '"s in the administration of the -law were it
plainly acknowledged for what it is-federal common law-and
its limitations defined. If we have a federal common law, it
should be recognized as such; then, in course of time, the re-
strictions to which it is heir, and the kind of cases to which it
properly applies, would be clearly indicated by a series of de-
cisions. In short, it would become an acknowledged system, of
which all litigants, not judicially classified as bound by or en-
titled to the laws of the separate states, would be given full and
equal advantage; and we would not, as at present, have common-
law principles administered in the United States courts according
to a method whereby a distinction exists between suitors in the
same class, so far as classes are now marked out by the written
law (that being the only sort of classification presently recog-
nized), some suitors enjoying the whole field of the unwritten
law, from which the federal judges may select such principles
as they, in their unrestricted judgment, may conceive to be ap-
plicable to the facts before them, while others in the same rec-
ognized class must have their cases determined according to the
locally restricted rules of the common law as decided by the
jurisdiction, or state, in which the litigation in the federal courts
happens to be tried. All of which leads to the conclusion that
we should acknowledge what, it seems, exists-ani independent
system of federal common law; for, though restricted in scope
and not to be claimed as a source of jurisdiction, this system
plays too great a part in our national jurisprudence to be refused




-Kansas v. Colorado, 2o6 U. S. 46, 98 (9o6) ; and note 134, supra.
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